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Abstract 
The government of Malawi has been implementing 
a large-scale Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) since 
2005/06 as an intervention aimed at improving food 
security by addressing resource poor smallholder farmers’ 
affordability constraints in purchasing inorganic fertilizers. 
However, in the design of the programme, there is lack 
of articulation on the graduation of some farmers from 
the subsidy over time. This paper considers ways in which 
the concept of graduation may be usefully applied to 
the FISP and sets out a broad conceptualisation of 
graduation for potential application in programme 
design and implementation.
1. Introduction
Since the 2005/06 agricultural season, the Government 
of Malawi (GOM) has been implementing a large-scale 
targeted Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP). The main 
objective of the programme is to raise incomes and 
household food security of up to 2 million (out of 3.4 
million) smallholder farmers through improvements in 
their agricultural productivity. The programme targets 
smallholder farmers who have land but cannot afford to 
purchase inputs (principally maize seed and fertilisers) 
at market prices. In the medium-term investment plan 
for the agricultural sector drawn up by the Government 
of Malawi, the agricultural input subsidy is identified as 
the main strategy for revitalizing the performance of the 
agricultural sector and reducing poverty in Malawi (GOM 
2007). Due to the high incidence of poverty and food 
insecurity among Malawi’s rural population, agricultural 
input subsidies can be seen within this as, in part at least, 
a social protection instrument, as they improve access 
and availability of food to vulnerable groups (Dorward 
et al. 2006).
This paper considers ways in which the concept of 
graduation may be usefully applied to the FISP. We begin 
with a broad discussion of the conceptualisation of 
graduation, first within the social protection literature 
and then within the context of an agricultural input 
subsidy programme. This provides the foundation for 
considering ways in which the issue of graduation might 
be addressed, first in programme design and 
implementation and second in programme 
evaluation.
The paper draws upon a considerable amount of 
information that is available regarding FISP and is set 
within a context of continuing evolution of the 
programme. The FISP has been evaluated since the 
2006/07 programme using the 2004/05 Integrated 
Household Survey as the baseline, with two further 
rounds of data collection in 2007and 2009 (ICL et al. 2007; 
SOAS et al. 2009; Dorward and Chirwa 2009; Dorward et 
al. 2010). This has generated three panels of households 
at national level with about 1,400 households being 
followed across all three surveys. Since 2005/06, several 
changes have taken place in the scope, scale and 
implementation of the programme. These include 
changes in the volume of subsidised inputs disbursed, 
a switch from a focus on multiple crops to only maize 
inputs, the use of open meeting community-based 
targeting of beneficiaries, and variations in involvement 
of the private sector (Dorward and Chirwa 2009). 
Furthermore, there is considerable variation between 
different areas within years as regards targeting criteria 
and mechanisms used in determining which farmers 
receive subsidised inputs, how many receive inputs, and 
how much inputs they receive (with sharing of bags 
causing many households to receive one instead of the 
prescribed two bags of fertiliser) (Dorward et al., 2010). 
Household surveys also find that although recipients are 
found among both poor and non-poor households, the 
non-poor with better asset endowments are somewhat 
more likely to receive subsidy coupons, though the extent 
of this declined between 2006/7 and 2009/9 (ICL et al. 
2007;Chirwa et al. 2010). Survey data also show that over 
time the displacement of commercial sales by subsidised 
sales has fallen, suggesting that smallholder farmers are 
increasingly purchasing fertilizers at market prices to 
supplement their subsidized fertilizers (Ricker-Gilbert 
and Jayne 2010). Chirwa et al. (2010) also find that some 
recipient households in the panel have had regular access 
to subsidized fertilizers since the programme started 
while others have had only intermittent access.
Graduation has emerged as an issue in debates about 
the future of the programme at the interface of a number 
of issues. The high costs of the programme, particularly 
in 2008/9 when FISP accounted for 16.2% of the national 
budget and 6.6% of GNP (Dorward and Chirwa 2009), 
posed serious questions about the fiscal and macro-
economic sustainability of the programme and hence a 
search by some commentators for some means of 
‘graduation’ that would allow its scaling down. Subsequent 
falls in fertiliser prices and reining back of the scale of 
the programme have led to marked reductions in 
programme cost, but government continues to look for 
high levels of effectiveness and efficiency from the 
programme. This also raises questions about the scope 
for focusing the subsidy on a smaller, and possibly 
reducing, subset of beneficiaries whose use of subsidies 
is both effective and efficient. These debates, however, 
raise a number of issues regarding the objectives against 
which effectiveness and efficiency can be judged (for 
example agricultural production, economic growth, 
national or household food security, poverty reduction 
or social protection objectives) and the means by which 
these objectives are achieved (for example are the latter 
objectives achieved by households producing more food 
or being able to buy food at lower prices?). Another set 
of (empirical) questions arise regarding first the actual 
impacts of the programme on households and the 
economies in which they live (in terms of improved 
livelihood resources and opportunities), and second the 
determinants of and interactions between these 
impacts.
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2. Conceptualising 
Graduation from Social 
Protection 
The concept of graduation in social protection is 
relatively recent and has been linked to issues of impact, 
dependency, exit and sustainability in the social 
protection discourse. It is typical in social protection 
interventions to raise issues of the extent to which the 
financial transfers to beneficiaries should and can enable 
them to exit from the programme of assistance and hence 
reduce the scope of social protection over time. 
Graduation from social protection has important 
implications for outreach and cost effectiveness as it 
allows providers to scale down their operations and 
reduce costs over time. Governments with tight budgets 
may be more willing to support social protection if access 
is time-bound or if there are clear prospects of a higher 
proportion of the target beneficiaries voluntarily exiting 
over time. The issue of graduation from social protection 
also arises due to the need to avoid ‘dependency 
syndrome’ among the beneficiaries (Devereux 2010).
2.1  Definition of Graduation from Social 
Protection
It is widely acknowledged in the literature that 
graduation is a difficult concept to define in the context 
of social protection interventions. Holmes and Slater 
(2008) define graduation from social protection as ‘the 
movement of households from a state of high vulnerability 
to shocks and stresses to one of increased resilience to 
such shocks and stresses, increased investment in 
productive assets and subsequent improved livelihood 
security’. Devereux (2010) notes that graduation should 
be a dynamic concept, ‘sustainable graduation’, that 
embodies increased capacity to generate future streams 
of income and resilience against future shocks. Slater 
(2009) also argues that the broad concept of graduation 
involves poor households moving out of poverty and 
away from dependency on social protection, to more 
sustainable, independent livelihood activities.
Another useful way of conceptualising graduation is 
the use of social protection transfers to achieve a shift 
in livelihood activities with ‘stepping up’ (intensification 
and increased productivity in existing activities) and 
‘stepping out’ (into new more productive activities), and 
reduced emphasis on ‘hanging in’ (avoidance of ‘falling 
down and out’) (see Dorward et al. 2006; Dorward 2009). 
This is related to shifts in emphasis in social protection 
programmes from welfare oriented safety nets to 
insurance and resilience based instruments (Dorward et 
al. 2006).
Graduation can be viewed from two different 
perspectives in the design of social protection 
interventions: open-ended and time-bound access to 
social protection. Open-ended social protection 
interventions are not designed with any expectation of 
graduation, and the concept of graduation is flexible, 
implying that graduation from social protection may 
occur voluntarily or not at all (as for example with pension 
programmes).
Time-bound programmes, on the other hand, can 
embody graduation by defining the period over which 
beneficiaries can receive assistance, after which they are 
expected to graduate into livelihoods which are both 
independent of social protection and sustainable (to use 
Slater’s conceptualisation). According to Devereux (2010), 
graduation embodies the time-bound notion of social 
transfers as temporary programmes, often with 
complementary capacity building measures, that should 
enable beneficiaries to support themselves after receiving 
transfers for a period of time. In such cases, it is assumed 
that a large proportion of beneficiaries will have built 
their capabilities to embark on sustainable and 
independent livelihoods after the social assistance ends. 
These livelihoods may be different from those that they 
engaged in before, or involve some transformation of 
current or previous livelihoods in ways that improve their 
productivity and resilience in the face of stresses and 
shocks.
Complementary capacity building measures 
implemented in time-bound social protection 
interventions often include training of beneficiaries in 
sustainable, independent livelihoods. For instance, the 
Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia, which 
incorporates the protective, preventive and promotional 
aspects of social protection, intends to graduate 
beneficiaries out of the programme within 5 years of 
implementation (Devereux, 2009). In the Challenging 
the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction – Targeting the Ultra 
Poor Programme (CFPR-TUP) in Bangladesh, the safety 
net is linked with access to microfinance in an explicit 
graduation model, in that the ultra-poor are provided 
with a safety net in the initial phase, improved access to 
health services, and skills training in enterprise 
development prior to qualifying for access to microfinance 
(Matin et al. 2008; Hashemi and Umaira 2010). This implies 
that the concept of graduation involves a process of 
building sufficient assets for the poor to enable them to 
participate more actively in productive activities. CPRC 
(2007) also notes that many of the conditional cash 
transfer programmes in Latin America are time-bound, 
intending that beneficiaries graduate after some period 
of access to social protection.
Graduation is therefore viewed as the potential to 
embark on sustainable, independent livelihoods without 
social protection. The expectation is that given sufficient 
assistance, beneficiaries may begin to engage in new 
livelihood activities by investing some of the transfers 
into productive activities. It is the incomes earned from 
these productive investments that will enable 
beneficiaries to graduate from social protection.
It is necessary here to distinguish between graduation 
as a process of becoming able to pursue an independent 
sustainable livelihood (which we term potential 
graduation) and actual graduation, with the termination 
of support but continued successful pursuit of an 
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independent sustainable livelihood. This distinction is 
explored in figure 1, where a movement from left to right 
(from A or C to B or D) represents the termination either 
of access to programme benefits or of a programme itself, 
a movement from A to C downwards represents potential 
graduation, and a movement from A to D represents 
actual graduation.
At least two scales of graduation are implicit in these 
models:
Household graduation, where individual •	
households develop capabilities to ‘step up’ and 
or ‘step out’ to engage in independent and 
sustainable livelihood activities, and
programme graduation, where a sufficient •	
number or proportion of households in a 
population develop such capabilities, allowing 
the termination of a social protection programme 
– which may or may not be replaced by another 
smaller and possibly open-ended programme, 
which may be focussed on households for whom 
graduation is either not possible or much more 
difficult.
The administration of social protection programmes 
across and within different administrative or livelihood 
zones allows for (multiple) scales of ‘area graduation’ 
intermediate between household and programme 
graduation (for example by village, ward or district). 
Recognition of multiple scales of graduation raises 
important issues regarding the relationships between 
these different scales(shown in figure 2) and the criteria 
that may be used to determine graduation.
The most obvious relationship is the dependence of 
area or programme graduation upon household 
graduation – or more generally of higher level graduation 
on lower level graduation (shown as upward arrows on 
the left of figure 2). Thus higher level graduation (rather 
than termination, as discussed below) depends upon 
prior lower level graduation since area graduation can 
only occur if some minimum scale of lower level 
graduation has occurred. This raises questions about 
criteria used at different scales, in both the definition of 
household graduation and the required number or % of 
households graduating (or conversely maximum number 
or % of ungraduated households) for area and/or 
programme graduation.
We must also consider how graduation of lower level 
units (households within areas or areas within 
programmes) may depend upon graduation of higher 
level units (areas containing households or programmes 
containing areas). We need to distinguish here between 
termination of social protection (the removal of social 
protection interventions from households that cannot 
pursue sustainable independent livelihoods) and 
graduation (the removal of social protection interventions 
from households that can now pursue sustainable 
independent livelihoods). Termination at lower units of 
analysis may result from termination at higher units of 
analysis as a result of, for example, budgetary constraints, 
time-bound programmes or policy change  (shown by 
the solid down arrows in the right and middle of figure 
2). Termination may, however, also occur for lower units 
as a result of graduation at higher units of analysis where 
the graduation criterion is not graduation by 100% of 
lower level units (shown by the downward diagonal 
arrows in figure 2). In this sense termination, not 
graduation, for lower units is affected by graduation by 
higher units.
There are, however, two ways in which lower units’ 
potential (and possibly actual) graduation may depend 
upon continuation rather than graduation or termination 
of higher units (shown by the crossed and dotted 
downward arrows to otherwise graduating areas and 
households in figure 2). The first arises where there are 
significant indirect effects from social protection 
interventions, the second where social protection 
programme provide public goods. We provide two 
Social Protection Programme
Access Termination of access
Figure 1. Termination, potential graduation and actual graduation
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examples of indirect effects. The insurance effect arises 
when the presence of a programme provides households 
with insurance against livelihoods shocks and stresses 
and allow them to take ‘stepping up’ and ‘stepping out’ 
investment risks even when they are not direct 
beneficiaries of a programme. Their pursuit of (and hence 
graduation to) independent sustainable livelihoods may 
then be dependent on the presence of a social protection 
programme rather than on their direct receipt of benefits 
from it. As a result, households that appear to have 
graduated from the programme may still in fact be 
dependent upon its existence, though not, under normal 
circumstances, on their direct engagement with it, as 
they are only willing to take the risks involved in this 
livelihood if they know that they can rely on help from 
the programme if things go wrong. In this situation the 
termination of a programme will cause them to abandon 
the new higher return but more risky livelihood and 
withdraw back to low productivity ‘hanging in’ activities 
(the Faustian bargain described by Wood 2003). Area or 
programme termination or graduation then undermines 
households’ stepping up and/or stepping out to 
sustainable livelihoods independent of social 
protection.
Another example of indirect effects arises where there 
are significant multiplier effects from households’ receipt 
of social protection transfers, for example where cash 
transfers lead to greater demand by recipient households 
of particular services whose supply provides income for 
other households. Where this is the case then graduation 
of higher units with termination of significant numbers 
of lower units may lead to a reduction in these multipliers 
and undermine the livelihoods of households who 
appeared to have achieved independent sustainable 
livelihoods. (This may also occur without termination if 
large numbers of lower units graduate and the switch 
from dependent to independent livelihoods is associated 
with reductions in expenditure patterns which supported 
graduation). These processes are shown by the dotted 
arrows marked with crosses in figure 2.
Social protection programmes normally provide 
private goods and services (which are consumed by 
individuals for their own benefits) but these may also 
generate positive externalities (as with the multipliers 
discussed above, or through social or environmental 
effects, though these may also be negative).Social 
protection programmes may also explicitly provide 
public goods for communities or wider groups, where 
for example they attempt to strengthen communal social 
protection mechanisms. By definition such programmes 
are delivered to intermediate or higher units (not 
households) but affect the livelihoods and welfare of 
lower units.
Graduation itself is therefore the removal of access to 
a social protection programme that does not leave 
current beneficiaries supported by the programme 
unable to pursue sustainable independent livelihoods. 
This definition, with its simple core requirement that 
graduation does not abandon beneficiaries to return to 
previous low levels of welfare, can be applied at different 
scales of analysis (individual, household, area or 
programme).
2.2  Measurement Issues
One of the major practical and theoretical challenges 
with graduation is how to define and measure graduation 
criteria, or how to determine the point at which 
beneficiaries can be weaned off a social assistance 
intervention with some minimum acceptable standard 
of welfare or probability of achieving a stable or upward 
Figure 2 Multi-scale relationships between social protection graduation and termination
Figure 1. Termination, potential graduation and actual graduation
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welfare or livelihood trajectory. Devereux (2010) argues 
that graduation criteria are difficult to define and 
operationalize, with difficulties in identifying both 
indicators or variables and critical attainments of welfare 
and self-reliance. This may require, for example, threshold 
values of incomes and assets that will not result in 
graduating households reverting back to situations of 
vulnerability.
While the practical determination of formal graduation 
from social protection in social protection programmes 
requires precise specification of both variables and 
thresholds defining graduation, prior investigation 
needed to develop this specification can to some extent 
separate the choice of variables and thresholds. 
One variable used in investigating graduation from 
social protection is the extent to which transfers allow 
beneficiaries to cross the income poverty line (Devereux 
2010). Another approach is to assess transfer contributions 
to building and accumulation of household control and 
access to assets (physical, social, human, financial and 
natural capital) which are necessary for sustainable 
livelihoods and assist the poor and vulnerable to move 
out of poverty, and cope better with shocks and stresses. 
Slater and McCord (2009) argue that asset accumulation 
is needed if graduation out of poverty is the desired 
outcome. The literature on poverty traps also emphasizes 
the importance of accumulation of assets as necessary 
for sustainable mobility out of poverty (Carter and Barrett 
2006; Carter and May 2001; Adato et al. 2006). Barrett et 
al. (2006) argue that because assets generate incomes 
for households, asset dynamics underpin structural 
income dynamics. Carter and Barrett (2006) also argue 
that with low assets households earn low returns on their 
asset holdings, which perpetuates their poverty because 
they earn less investible surplus after meeting their 
immediate consumption needs. This then suggests that 
thresholds for achieving independent sustainable 
livelihoods cannot be defined in terms of (essentially 
arbitrary) income poverty lines, but by the crossing of 
asset and income thresholds associated with poverty 
traps. These are likely to vary with household structures 
(for example gender composition and dependency 
ratios), with socio-economic and cultural context, with 
livelihood strategies and opportunities, and with complex 
interactions between the different forms of capital listed 
above. A more fundamental issue that is raised here, 
however, is that graduation measures need to be 
concerned with achievement of conditions (inputs and 
processes)necessary for the pursuit of sustainable 
independent livelihoods rather than the achievement 
of welfare outcomes which tell us little about livelihoods, 
independence, or sustainability.
A further complexity arises with the conceptualisation 
of poverty traps operating at wider scales of analysis in 
local economies (Rodenstein-Rodan 1943; Dorward et 
al. 2005a, 2005b, 2009a).This is linked to earlier discussion 
of the different scales or units of graduation, and with 
the consideration of the variables and thresholds used 
for determining area and programme graduation. We 
return to consider these issues in more detail later, in the 
context of graduation from input subsidy programmes, 
but note here that changes in income levels are likely to 
be less useful than consideration of volumes of livelihood 
activities at these wider scales (Dorward 2009) or, perhaps 
more importantly, changes in volumes of stepping up 
and stepping out activities. Even without these 
considerations, however, determination of potential 
graduation for areas and programmes is likely to involve 
some threshold number or percentage of beneficiary 
graduation (or non-graduation) at area or programme 
level, since programmes are unlikely to be cost effective 
and sustainable if over time they serve fewer and fewer 
beneficiaries.
2.3  Conditions Facilitating(or Impeding) 
Graduation
The extent to which social protection interventions 
enable beneficiaries to graduate from dependency on 
social transfers depend on many factors. These factors 
include targeting, the value and nature of the benefits, 
the duration of access, and access to other complementary 
interventions. First, the extent and severity of poverty 
and the nature of the target groups matter for the 
effectiveness of social protection programmes. It is 
generally argued that extremely poor and unproductive 
households, such as the elderly, may require open-ended, 
indefinite social protection and are not expected to 
graduate from time-bound social protection. Conversely, 
there is a higher likelihood that a relatively high proportion 
of beneficiaries can graduate from social protection 
programmes if the target group is the productive 
poor.
Holmes and Slater (2008) argue that ‘the prospects 
for graduation from social protection depend on the 
conditions in which the poor live, the form and the value 
of the benefits from social protection’. In this the value 
and nature of the benefits of social transfers is one of the 
critical factors in facilitating the graduation of 
beneficiaries, but the determination of the benefits in 
turn requires a clear understanding of the nature and 
severity of poverty and vulnerability, and the socio-
cultural environment. If benefits just meet subsistence 
needs of the beneficiaries, there may be very little 
prospect of graduation (Slater 2009). As Davies (2009) 
notes, the size of social transfers is rarely sufficient to 
enable significant reduction in poverty, although there 
tends to be a reduction in the severity of poverty, unless 
transfers raise the incomes of large numbers of poor 
people whose incomes lie just below the poverty line. 
Social protection interventions that provide benefits that 
allow both livelihood protection and livelihood promotion 
are more likely to succeed in increasing incomes of the 
target groups; hence enabling graduation. Others, such 
as Devereux (2006), have argued that the predictability 
of social transfers is also important in changing beneficiary 
behaviour.
Related to the issue of the value of the benefits is the 
issue of duration of access to social transfers by target 
households. The duration over which benefits are 
received by beneficiaries and how such resources are 
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spent also determine the extent to which beneficiaries 
can graduate from social protection interventions (Slater 
and McCord 2009). Some social protection programmes 
are implemented as short-term interventions, and unless 
their transfers are massive, the extent to which this can 
facilitate graduation is limited. For example, Chirwa et 
al. (2002) found that recent participation in a public works 
programme implemented over 1 to 3 months had greater 
impact on well-being for participation within the past 
year than participation two or more years ago, suggesting 
little long term benefits from such participation.
Another important factor that can facilitate graduation 
of beneficiaries from social protection interventions is 
the existence of other complementary interventions that 
build the capacity of beneficiaries to undertake 
independent livelihood activities. Holmes and Slater 
(2008) note that livelihood promotion measures, such 
as predictable transfers or programmes linked to training 
can facilitate investments by vulnerable households in 
productive assets or skills development, enabling them 
to increase their incomes. CPRC (2007) notes that 
integrating social protection interventions into a wider 
rural development programme can enhance the 
effectiveness of social protection. The BRAC CFPR-TUP 
programme in Bangladesh, that builds the capacity of 
the poor to access financial services through a 
combination of social transfers and training in enterprise 
management, offers higher prospects of graduation from 
social protection (Matin et al 2008; Hashemi and Umaira 
2010).
A final factor that needs to be considered in examination 
of conditions facilitating graduation is the state of the 
economy in which graduating beneficiaries are 
embedded. If this is large and healthy relative to the 
number of people receiving social protection then less 
attention needs to be paid to our earlier consideration 
of negative feedbacks from programme termination and 
the effects of poverty traps operating at wider scales of 
analysis in local economies. Multi-scale interactions will, 
however, be much more important if beneficiaries make 
up a large part of the local or wider economy and/or the 
economy is poorly developed, with thin markets for 
goods and services which poor households and 
graduating beneficiaries produce and consume.
2.4  Socio-political Issues
A final comment is needed on the importance of social 
and political influences on processes and decisions in 
graduation from social protection. The discussion in this 
section has taken a very technical view regarding 
determination of influences affecting the ways that social 
protection leads to potential graduation, considering the 
specification of variables and thresholds for determining 
termination decisions based on the achieving actual 
graduation, and the relationships between these 
processes and decisions at different scales of analysis 
and administration. These termination decisions are, 
however, highly political, in terms of local, national and 
bureaucratic policies concerned with, respectively, 
questions about which people and groups of people 
benefit from social protection transfers; which areas, 
constituencies and ethnic groups benefit from social 
protection programmes; and how limited government 
and donor resources are allocated between agencies and 
sectors. These issues also need to be taken into account 
in the design, implementation and evaluation of 
graduation and termination in social protection 
programmes.
3. Conceptualising 
Graduation from 
Agricultural Input Subsidies
3.1  Relationships between agricultural 
input subsidies and social protection
Dorward et al (2006) and Dorward et al (2008) identify 
five types of linkage between agriculture and social 
protection:
a. Social protection (inter alia) from agriculture and 
agricultural growth
b. Social protection independent of agricultural growth 
c. Social protection for (inter alia) agricultural growth
d. Social protection through (inter alia) agriculture
e. Social protection with (inter alia) agriculture
The differentiation between (a), (d) and (e) is primarily 
one of emphasis, with (a) describing state-led programmes 
conceived and implemented primarily as agricultural 
development programmes, (d) describing programmes 
conceived and implemented primarily as social protection 
interventions but operating through agricultural 
instruments, and (e) describing programmes which 
explicitly address both agricultural development and 
social protection objectives. Dorward et al. (2009b) argue 
that in many ways Malawi’s agricultural policies have 
moved in turn from (a) in the 1970s through (b) in the 
early 1990s liberalisation of agriculture to (c) in the late 
1990s to (d) with the Targeted Input Programme (TIP) in 
the early 2000s and finally to (e) with the FISP since 
2005/6. Although the FISP is implemented by the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Food Security primarily as an 
agricultural development programme, its increasing 
emphasis on targeting the poor is seen by many observers 
as also and perhaps largely fulfilling a social protection 
role. The distinction between social protection and 
agricultural development objectives is also blurred by 
increasing emphasis within social protection on its 
promotional and transformative roles in encouraging 
growth (Dorward et al 2006; Devereux and Sabates-
Wheeler 2004).
The close relationship between social protection and 
agricultural development objectives is, as we will see 
below, closely related to the potential growth, agricultural 
development, and livelihood outcomes from the 
programme. This then has significant implications for 
potential graduation processes.
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3.2  Potential Contributions of FISP to 
Growth, Agricultural Development, 
and Livelihoods
  Understanding the constraints limiting agricultural 
and livelihood development is an essential starting point 
for understanding FISP’s potential to address these 
constraints and promote sustained growth and 
welfare.
Dorward and Chirwa (2011) building on SOAS et al. 
(2008) characterise the Malawian economy as suffering 
from a ‘low maize productivity trap’ whereby large inter-
year maize price instability means that fear of low maize 
prices deters less poor, potential maize surplus farmers 
from investing in high yielding seeds and inputs for 
surplus maize production while fear of high maize prices 
forces poor, maize deficit farmers to grow as much maize 
as they can, even though they cannot afford to purchase 
high yielding seeds and fertiliser. The result is that large 
amounts of cultivated land in Malawi are used for maize 
production with very low yields, and this depresses land 
and labour productivity across the agricultural sector 
and indeed across the whole economy. Consequent low 
farm incomes lead to poverty, tie resources into the 
agricultural sector, and depress both supply and demand 
for non-agricultural goods and services. This is illustrated 
in figure 3.
We should note immediately that this analysis of the 
low maize productivity trap is essentially about a farm/
household poverty trap, but this is intrinsically linked to 
a wider local and national scale cross-sectoral or macro 
poverty trap of low productivity, low supply and low 
demand. Also linked at a meso-sectoral scale is an 
agricultural input and output market trap where low 
volumes lead to thin markets, with high transaction risks 
and costs depressing market investments (see Dorward 
et al. 2005a, 2005b, 2009a).
Dorward and Chirwa (2011) unpick the farm / 
household constraints to increased investment in maize 
production (particularly in inorganic fertilisers) by 
separating these into profitability constraints, which 
affect less poor potential surplus producers, and 
affordability constraints, which affect poor deficit 
producers who make up 60% of Malawian smallholder 
farmers (SOAS et al.2008). Profitability constraints exist 
because with high prices of fertilizers and low maize 
prices, it becomes unprofitable to grow maize for sale. 
Higher maize prices may be one way of improving 
profitability, but such high prices are also bad for the 
many smallholder farmers who are net buyers of maize. 
Lower fertiliser marketing and transport costs could help 
here. However, this needs expanded demand for fertilisers 
across the country and it is difficult to achieve this where 
most farmers are constrained by affordability problems. 
Poor farmers have very limited working capital for 
consumption and production between harvests and have 
very limited access to agricultural credit or ability to repay 
loans for food production inputs.
Substantial input price reductions through the FISP 
provide a means for addressing problems of both 
profitability and affordability, with different impacts on 
different types of households. Understanding these 
different impacts, and how they impact on wider 
non-agricultural incomes and markets, is important for 
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* Dotted arrows represent feedback effects
Figure 3 Vicious Circle of the Low Productivity Maize Production Trap*
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assessing potential processes for graduation from 
agricultural input subsidies. SOAS et al. (2008) presents 
a framework for understanding the different direct and 
indirect impacts of input subsidies on different households 
in a rural economy, as presented in Figure 4.
Critical to understanding the impact of subsidies on 
different households is an understanding of differences 
in the seasonal finance constraints they face. Receipt of 
subsidised inputs (or input vouchers) may lead to three 
different responses: (a) sale of the inputs (vouchers); (b) 
their use to increase input application (i.e. use when 
inputs would not otherwise have been used) and (c) their 
use instead of inputs that would otherwise have been 
purchased with household working capital. Responses 
(a) and (c) represent an effective transfer of income to 
poor and less poor households, respectively. For poor 
households this is likely to reduce their need to hire 
labour out to meet pre-harvest consumption needs, and 
thereby contract the supply of casual wage labour, while 
for less poor households this may increase the capital 
available and demand for hiring in labour, and thereby 
expand the demand of casual wage labour (see Dorward 
2011 for an exposition of the effects of pre-seasonal 
finance constraints on farm household behaviour and 
welfare). The tightening of demand and supply should 
lead to higher pre-harvest wages, benefiting poorer 
farmers.
Response (b) should lead to increased maize production 
at the end of the season, increasing maize stocks and 
market supplies, and lowering maize prices, with 
consequent increases in real incomes for all poorer (net 
food buying) households, as well as for households 
benefiting from higher production. Lower maize prices 
during the following season should then have similar 
effects to those described earlier for households receiving 
subsidised inputs with responses (a) and (c). Higher input 
use should also lead increased demand and supply for 
input services, and higher real incomes should lead to 
increased investment in farm and non-farm activities, 
and to increased demand for farm and non-farm produce 
and services.
These arguments suggest that the FISP can address 
the different household, meso-sectoral and cross-sectoral 
or macro constraints causing the low maize productivity 
trap, provided that other events do not cause maize 
prices to rise. Evidence presented in Dorward and Chirwa 
(2011) on real wages and more recent anecdotal reports 
of increased supply and demand in horticultural 
production both support this analysis of FISP outcomes. 
The latter reports of diversification into horticultural 
production highlight an apparently paradoxical feature 
of the role of the FSIP in combating the ‘low maize 
productivity trap’ (LMPT): although the FISP has been 
largely pushing inputs for increasing maize productivity 
(‘stepping up’ to use terminology introduced earlier), it 
should actually increase diversification of agriculture 
(‘stepping out’ of maize into horticulture and other high 
value products such as livestock) and of rural economies 
(‘stepping out’ of agriculture). Such ‘stepping up’ and 
‘stepping out’ is a normal process of structural change 
in the growth of any poor agricultural economy (a relative 
Note: dotted lines represent negative effects for less poor maize surplus households
Source: SOAS et al. (2008)
Figure 4 Framework for Understanding Household and local economy Impacts of Input Subsidies
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shift out of low productivity staple food production into 
higher productivity staple, horticultural and livestock 
production and into non-agricultural activities).
Finally, it should be noted that all of the benefits of 
the programme (increasing maize productivity and 
diversification) should be strengthened by complementary 
investments that promote higher responses to fertilisers 
and/ or lower transport and market costs.
4. Graduation Pathways for 
the Malawi Farm Input 
Subsidy Programme
Discussion of graduation processes in social protection 
programmes in section 2 emphasised the processes of 
stepping up and stepping out; multi-scale aspects of 
interactions between graduation and termination; 
alternative income, livelihood activity and asset variables 
and thresholds in defining potential graduation; the 
importance of a range of different conditions facilitating 
(or impeding) graduation (including the depth and 
incidence of poverty among beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries; the value, nature and duration of 
benefits; complementary services, and the wider socio-
economic environment); and socio-political factors. 
Graduation was defined as the removal of access to a 
social protection programme that does not leave current 
beneficiaries supported by the programme unable to 
pursue sustainable independent livelihoods.
Discussion of the FISP in section 3 raised similar issues 
regarding stepping up and stepping out processes; multi-
scale interactions; changes in livelihood activities as 
critical elements in potential graduation; and the 
importance of complementary services and the wider 
socio-economic environment. Issues which were 
implicitly rather than explicitly considered include effects 
on livelihoods of the depth and incidence of poverty 
among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries; and the 
value, nature and duration of subsidised benefits. No 
consideration has been given to alternative income and 
asset variables and thresholds or livelihood activity 
changes in defining potential graduation and in 
implementing graduation and termination in the FISP. 
Socio-political considerations in this have also not been 
considered.
We now consider a definition of graduation specific 
to the FISP, and this leads to identification of specific 
graduation processes and pathways, bringing together 
insights from graduation processes in social protection 
programmes with our understanding of the role of FISP 
in combating the LMPT.
Discussion of subsidy programme contributions to 
development as discussed in section 3 suggest that the 
core requirement for graduation from the subsidy 
programme is that removal of access to the subsidy 
programme does not reduce land, labour and capital 
productivity in maize production 1 . This provides a new 
definition of graduation analogous to our definition for 
social protection and opens up different ways both of 
viewing graduation processes and of defining and 
monitoring ‘potential graduation’ at higher (area) and 
lower (household) levels. This is because it allows us to 
identify a number of higher and lower level ‘potential 
graduation conditions’ which are required in some 
combination as a result of and during the implementation 
of the FISP for subsequent graduation. These 
comprise:
Fall in unsubsidised input prices compared to 1. 
pre-programme prices
Reduced requirements for purchase of previously 2. 
subsidised inputs due to increased efficiency in 
use
Reduced requirements for purchase of previously 3. 
subsidised inputs due to substitution by cheaper 
inputs
Increase in working capital among poor beneficiary 4. 
households for cash purchase of previously 
subsidised inputs
Poor beneficiary households’ diversification out of 5. 
maize production through either transfer of land to 
other high value production use (diversification or 
stepping out of maize within agriculture) or transfer 
of land to other users with diversification or stepping 
out of agriculture into non-farm activities
Access to low cost credit by poor beneficiary 6. 
households for purchase of previously subsidised 
inputs.
These conditions share a number of features.
•	 None	of	these	potential	and	desirable	changes	can	
be ruled out as irrelevant or impossible, nor can any 
be identified as being of paramount importance.
•	 They	are	all	dependent	on	multi-scale	processes	of	
stepping up and stepping out to create the systemic 
conditions under which sufficient change can be 
achieved for them to contribute to graduation by 
some households.
•	 They	can	all	benefit	from	promotion	in	design	and	
implementation.
We can, however, note that they are likely to vary in 
the extent to which they will be accessible to different 
households and in the speed at which necessary changes 
will happen. These changes also, of course, require 
different types of promotion in programme design and 
implementation and in complementary investments. 
Table 1 summarises the likely processes and requirements 
needed for each of the ‘potential graduation conditions’ 
listed above. The final column of the table classifies them 
by the speed at which it is reasonable for the changes 
to become effective in promoting potential graduation. 
This will depend upon households’ initial structures and 
resource holdings, their receipt of subsidised inputs over 
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the life of the subsidy programme, events and shocks 
affecting their welfare and resources, and changes in the 
local and wider socio-economic environment – which 
will depend in part upon subsidy implementation and 
responses within their own communities and beyond.
Most of the entries in table 1 require little elaboration. 
For (1), there is a large number of reports on the potential 
for reducing prices for inorganic fertilisers by improving 
transport systems and management during importation 
and distribution, by switching from 23:21:12 to a cheaper 
but equally effective formulation, and possibly by 
investing in a fertiliser blending plant in Malawi (Munthali 
2007). Increasing working capital of beneficiary 
households (4) is the most commonly considered 
pathway for potential graduation in social protection 
programmes (as discussed earlier), but its effectiveness 
in actually allowing potential graduation is also recognised 
to be very dependent upon the household’s initial asset 
status relative to some threshold needed for sustainable 
independent livelihoods, and upon structural issues 
(such as household composition) and exposure to 
adverse shocks (again, as discussed earlier). Diversification 
out of maize production is likely to take some time as it 
depends upon wider structural change and developing 
confidence of low and stable maize prices in consumer 
markets. It is, however, likely to be a pre-condition for 
the development of access to low cost credit (6), since 
this is only likely to be possible with some form of micro-
finance system where borrowers engage in different 
micro-enterprises with different seasonal patterns of 
income and expenditure and different risks (for example 
Dorward et al. 2001).
Turning now to consider (2) – ‘increased efficiency in 
input use’ – there is considerable evidence on the 
potential for raising returns to fertiliser use by greater 
use of high yielding seed, more timely planting, more 
effective soil health management, timely weeding, more 
effective fertiliser application methods, and greater use 
of complementary organic fertilisers (for example Maize 
Productivity Task Force 1997;Snapp et al. 2010).
Organic fertilisers and legume intercropping and 
rotations can also substitute for and augment inorganic 
fertilisers – listed under (3) above, ‘substitution by cheaper 
inputs’. Major difficulties with the adoption of such 
systems have been the labour and/or land requirements 
for fallows, for tree planting and maintenance, and for 
growing green manures and mulches (for example 
Barrett et al. 2002). These labour and land requirements 
are particularly problematic and high for land- and 
labour-constrained poor households who suffer most 
from the Low Maize Productivity Trap. Such households 
might be expected to gain significant benefits from an 
improved maize / semi-perennial legume (pigeon pea 
and groundnut intercrop) rotation system which can offer 
equivalent maize production to unfertilised maize but 
with added legume sales and high protein consumption 
(Snapp et al. 2010). However, adoption of these systems 
faces significant transition problems as a result of lost 
maize production when introducing a legume crop in 
the first year of a rotation. Participation in the subsidy 
programme, however, offers opportunities to address 
this problem in three ways:
By increasing maize productivity on people’s land, 1. 
the programme should help farmers to get more 
maize from their land, so that if they allocate say 
1/3 of their land to ground nuts/pigeon peas in year 
1 and use fertiliser on the other 2/3 of their land 
they could still have roughly the same or more maize 
as they would with all their land under maize without 
the subsidy, plus the legume. In year 2 they could 
do the same but because of the benefits from the 
land rotated under the previous year, they would 
get more maize, and by year 4 they would have got 
all their land into the rotation.
 By reducing the price of maize and raising wages, 2. 
the programme should also make farmers less 
desperate to grow all their own maize, allowing 
them to buy any shortfall for less. This should reduce 
the risks of not producing enough maize during the 
transition.
Table 1 Processes, requirements and sequencing of changes
Potential graduation Conditions Likely processes and requirements Order
1. Reduced input prices Efficient & competitive importers, supplier(s), transporters; 
improved transport infrastructure
1
2. Increased efficiency in input use Improved agronomy, complementary seed, inorganic & organic 
fertilisers, soil management. Investment in agricultural research 
and extension
1
3. Substitution by cheaper inputs Increased legume cultivation with rotational fallows. Good legume 
seed supply, produce demand & markets; Stable & reliable low 
maize prices & high maize productivity for transition before subsidy 
removal
1
4. Increase working capital for input 
purchases
Increased incomes, diversified incomes with reduced income 
seasonality.
1
5. Diversification out of maize 
production
Stable & reliable low maize prices, strong demand for high value 
farm products and/or non-farm goods & services, land markets & 
safety nets
2
6. Access to low cost credit for input 
purchases
Increased & diversified incomes, innovative & low cost micro-
finance systems. 
2
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By raising real incomes the programme should 3. 
increase the demand for legumes within households 
and in the wider market, raising the value to 
households of their legume production.
5. Programme Design and 
Implementation to Promote 
Graduation
The identification of the different graduation pathways 
in the previous section has immediate implications for 
two aspects of programme design and implementation: 
first the programme should be implemented in ways 
that actively promote these graduation pathways, and 
second actual graduation procedures should be built 
into programme implementation.
Interventions needed to promote graduation pathways 
vary between pathways and generally align with and 
strengthen the importance of existing programme or 
development objectives. Thus interventions to promote 
lower input prices and to increase efficiency in input use 
and substitution by cheaper inputs should all raise the 
efficiency of the programme. Similarly, increases in 
working capital among poor beneficiary households 
should be aligned with (and possibly be an achievement 
indicator for) programme objectives. Encouraging 
diversification out of maize and agriculture and promoting 
access to low cost credit are valuable general objectives 
for rural development, but are not so obviously 
complementary to the FISP, and may therefore need 
special (and specialised) attention.
As regards actual graduation (and termination) 
procedures, three broad approaches may be followed, 
singly or in any combination: (a) reductions in subsidy 
per household; (b) reduction in the number of areas or 
districts served by the programme with phased 
withdrawal of the programme from particular areas or 
districts; (c) withdrawal of the programme from particular 
households. Options (b) and (c) require criteria for 
determining graduation or termination of the subsidy 
by area or household. Criteria are likely to include 
budgetary constraints, political factors, efficiency 
differentials, and potential graduation. Potential 
graduation may be measured using variables related to 
the potential graduation changes identified in table 12 . 
Attention should also be paid to questions about 
sequencing and relationships between area graduation/ 
termination and household graduation, as discussed 
earlier in section 2.1.
6. Summary
This paper has considered ways in which the concept 
of graduation may be usefully applied to the Malawi Farm 
Input Subsidy Programme. Initial consideration of the 
concept of graduation in social protection programmes 
led to
a) a definition of graduation as removal of access to a 
social protection programme that does not leave 
current beneficiaries supported by the programme 
unable to pursue sustainable independent 
livelihoods,
b) a distinction between graduation and termination 
of access which makes beneficiaries worse off, 
and
c) consideration of differences and inter-relationships 
between graduation and termination at different 
scales, such as household, area and programme.
These conceptual issues suggest that measures of 
graduation should use variables and thresholds which 
measure assets and activities supporting sustainable 
independent livelihoods rather than income measures, 
and such measures need to take account of different 
opportunities, threats and difficulties facing different 
people in different contexts.
Application of these lessons to graduation in 
agricultural input subsidy programmes like the Malawi 
FISP requires some understanding first of the relationship 
between social protection and agriculture (characterised 
as social protection through agriculture), and second of 
the processes by which the Malawi FISP promotes 
sustainable independent livelihoods. This allowed a 
definition of graduation as removal of access to the 
subsidy programme that does not reduce land, labour 
and capital productivity in maize production. ‘Potential 
graduation conditions’ which promote these include 
reduced input prices, increased efficiency in input use, 
substitution by cheaper inputs, increased working capital 
for input purchases, diversification out of maize 
production, and access to low cost credit for input 
purchases. Identification of these potential graduation 
conditions is valuable in suggesting types of change that 
programme designers and implementers should seek 
to promote, as well as variables that may be used in 
making decisions about graduation criteria and processes. 
Further work is needed to determine how some of these 
changes may be promoted (although some suggestions 
are put forward in section 4), and what criteria (variables 
and thresholds) may be best for judging potential 
graduation.
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End Notes
   This paper is an extended version of a policy paper in the 
Evaluation of the Malawi Farm Input Subsidy Programme 
funded by the Department for International Development 
(DFID), Malawi. We acknowledge the financial support 
provided by DFID. The views expressed in this paper are those 
of the authors and the usual disclaimer applies.
 1  Ideally one would identify the critical resource here, but for 
many communities land is critically short, while for poor 
households capital and labour are critically short, but these 
are exchangeable through the labour market. 
 2  These may also be appropriate variables in analysis of 
targeting effectiveness and programme efficiency, since 
provision of subsidised inputs in areas and to households 
that are potential graduates suggests ineffective targeting 
and inefficiency, in that delivery of subsidised inputs to 
potential graduates will not generally achieve immediate 
programme objectives of raising maize productivity.
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